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One of the most significant developments in contemporary economics is the 
type of constitutional thinking that has evolved from Professor Buchanan's 
work, Within this strand of thought, a central - and still Iargely unsolved -
question is: why is it that peopie obey rules, particularly self-imposed rules and 
constitutions, even if they could easily disregard them? The answer suggested 
in tbis paper is that people have a preference for observing such rules, and this 
integrates rule-obedience into the ordinary rational calculus. 
The preference for observing certain rules, we are told, may be due to some 
evolutionary process or to explicit choice. While I have no objection to the 
evolutionary story (which tells us that whatever we observe today has its roots 
somewhere in the past), I am slightly sceptical regarding a possible choice of 
rules. 
For the sake of brevity I refrain here from entering the infinite recourse 
suggested in the title of the paper, but it seems difficult to maintain that a rule 
will be chosen rationally that requires, under certain conditions, actions that are 
not utility maximizing. I am alluding here to the standard argument against rule 
utilitarianism that underpins "the economist's familiar prejudices against the 
rationality of deliberative choices made in order to constrain choices". 1 It runs 
as follows. Let C be the set of possible circumstances and denote by A the set 
of possible actions. Denote further the set of possible rules by R. Any possible 
rule r E R assigns an action a E A to any given circumstance c E C. If an 
individual has chosen a possible rule r that under certain circumstances c' 
requires an action a' = r ( c') that is worse than a possible action a" under these 
circumstances, then there is another rule r* that is strictly better than rand is 
defined as follows: for all circumstances save c', apply rule rand choose 
a = r (c); for c', choose a": 
r*(c) = r(c) for all c ECj{C'}, r*(c') = a". 
1 The quotation is from BUCHAl-lAN [1994), The argument against rule utilitarianism 
is given e.g. in MACKIE [1977, 136-138]. Mackie also observes that psychological consid-
erations may restriet the set of possible rules and render rule utilitarianism meaningfuL 
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If a suboptimal rule such as r is rationally chosen, this would require that r* is 
not available (Le. not in R). So this part of Professor Buchanan's argument 
seems to require either that people choose suboptimal rules (such as r) because 
they simple like them or there are real constraints - rather than self-imposed 
constraints - that render the amended rule r* unavailable. Both arguments 
would merge if psychological constraints were to prevent people from choosing 
r* rather than r. There may be moral reasons supporting r that are not valid for 
r*. The rule "Always tell the truth!" may be justified more convincingly than 
the apparently better rule "Always tell the truth unless lying can't be de-
tected! ", and people may prefer the first rule because they like justifying their 
action. Such an argument builds on psychological dispositions that determine 
what is morally convincing and what is not convincing. The moral reasons 
cannot, themselves, result from utility maximization, since they constrain be-
havior away from utility maximization. This may benefit society, as Professor 
Buchanan argues. It may, however, also be very harmful not only for the 
individual foregoing some immediate benefits, but also for society at large. 
Moral behavior may have indeed very dire consequences; morality is not 
always a good thing. 
Another aspect of norms ought to be stressed a little more than is done in the 
paper, namely that the rules people observe are widely shared and should be 
conceived, there/ore, as largely independent 0/ idiosyncratic choices . .. This points 
to shared propensities of men and, therefore, to invariances of psychological 
organization. The point may be illustrated by David HUME's [1978] theory of 
property, where property is related to "a quality ... in human nature, that when 
two objects appear in elose relation to each other, the mind is apt to ascribe 
them any additional relation, in order to complete the union." Property is, 
according to Hume, such a completion of "a relation betwixt a person and an 
object". He traces many observations back to these psychological propensities. 
" ... And I farther observe, that a sensible relation, without any present power, 
is sometimes sufficient to give a title to any object. The sight of a thing is seldom 
a considerable relation, and is only regarded as such, when the object is hidden, 
or very obscure; in which case we find, that the view alone conveys a property; 
according to that maxim, that even a whole continent belongs to a nation, which 
first discover'd it. 'Tis however remarkable, that both in the case of discovery 
and that of possession, the first discoverer and possessor must join to the 
relation an intention of rendering hirnself proprietor, otherwise the relation will 
not have its effect; and that because the connection in our fancy betwixt the 
property and the relation is not so great, but that it requires to be help'd by such 
an intention"2. 
It seems to me that psychological considerations of this kind may help us to 
und erstand widely shared constitutional elements such as the rules goveming 
2 The quotations are from HUME [1978,506-507]. See KUBON-GILKE and SCHLICHT 
[1993] for a discussion of David Hume's theory of property in its relation to gestalt 
psychology. 
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property, and mayaiso be helpful in understanding the emotions ultimately 
underpinning and establishing these rules. All this is, however, not a matter of 
choke. 
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